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Shifting Contours of Directors’ Fiduciary
Duties and Norms in Comparative
Corporate Governance
Jennifer G. Hill*

Corporate law and corporate governance are often called upon to address problems in
international and transnational contexts. Financial markets are global and the problems in those
markets are often similar, if not identical, even though the capital market structure across
jurisdictions differs significantly. The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by a spate
of international corporate scandals, and the 2007–2009 global financial crisis reflected the global
interconnectedness of contemporary international capital markets.
These events highlighted the issue of accountability for wrongful conduct by company directors
and officers. Modern corporate governance is highly fragmented, encompassing an array of techniques
to control the improper exercise of discretion and conflicts of interest. According to Professor Gilson,
it is “a braided framework” that encompasses, not only autonomous legal rules, but also nonbinding norms.
This Article analyzes, from a comparative perspective, two core aspects of this “braided
framework.” First, the Article considers fiduciary duties. It argues that, although there are broad
similarities in the scope and operation of fiduciary duties in common law jurisdictions, such as the
United States, United Kingdom and Australia, at a more granular level, there are important
differences, which may affect the accountability of directors and officers.
Secondly, the Article examines corporate codes. Although generally non-binding, corporate
codes can create powerful norms concerning the role of directors and officers and the exercise of their
powers. These codes may also interact with fiduciary duties in complex and interesting ways, either
complementing, or creating tensions with, those duties. Yet, such codes are by no means
homogeneous, and substantive differences can often be traced to the identity of the actors responsible
for writing them.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate law and corporate governance are often called upon to address
problems in international and transnational contexts. Financial markets are global
and the problems in those markets are often similar, if not identical, even though
the capital market structure across jurisdictions differs significantly. The beginning
of the twenty-first century was marked by a spate of international corporate
scandals,1 including Enron and WorldCom in the United States.2 These scandals
were similar but isolated events. The same cannot be said of the 2007–2009 global
financial crisis, which exemplified the global “interconnectedness” of contemporary
international capital markets.3
These corporate crises prompted significant financial market reforms.4
Discerning the causes of these crises was no easy feat, yet the framing of the
underlying problems was critical to the regulatory responses. For example, the
collapse of Enron had multiple possible explanations, from board failure, to
conflicts of interest of auditors and other reputational intermediaries, to defective
remuneration structures.5 In relation to the global financial crisis, opinion was
divided as to whether shareholders were part of the problem, or a potential solution,
to excessive risk-taking in corporate law.6
These crises highlighted the issue of accountability for improper conduct by
company directors and officers. Modern corporate regulation today “occurs in
many rooms.”7 It is highly fragmented, encompassing an array of techniques to

* Bob Baxt AO Chair in Corporate and Commercial Law, Monash University Faculty of Law,
Melbourne, Australia; Research Member, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). I would
like to thank participants at the Transnational Fiduciary Law Conference, convened by UCI Law and
Bucerius Law School in 2019, and Mitheran Selvendran for research and editing assistance.
1. These scandals included, for example, Royal Ahold in the Netherlands, Parmalat in Italy,
Elan in Ireland, Kirch in Germany, and One.Tel and HIH in Australia. See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini & Paolo
Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, in AFTER ENRON:
IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE
US 159 (John Armour & Joseph A McCahery eds., 2006); Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses
to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 367 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., What
Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); see also
Geoffrey P. Miller, Catastrophic Financial Failures: Enron and More, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 423 (2004).
3. See Tony D’Aloisio, Chairman, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n, Presentation at the Asia
Securities Forum in Sydney: Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 13 (Oct. 12, 2009).
4. Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of Financial
Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1147 (2009). Professor Enriques describes
the response to the global financial crisis in these terms, however, the same can also be said for the
earlier set of scandals, including Enron. See Hill, supra note 1.
5. See generally Coffee, supra note 2. See also Gordon, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes,
41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497 (2018).
7. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 1 (1981).
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control improper exercise of discretion and conflicts of interest, to ensure
accountability. According to Professor Gilson, corporate governance is “a braided
framework encompassing legal and non-legal elements”8 – not only autonomous
legal rules, but also non-binding principles, processes, and institutions.9
This Article discusses two core aspects of this “braided framework”, which
provide constraints on how directors and officers exercise their powers and
discretion. The first of these is the law relating to directors’ fiduciary duties, which
occupies a central role in common law jurisdictions. This Article examines the
fiduciary duties of directors and officers from a comparative law perspective in three
common law jurisdictions: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. It
shows that although, at a general level, there are broad similarities across these
countries, at a more granular level, there are important differences which may affect
the accountability of directors and officers.
Fiduciary duties were once the primary constraint on the powers and
discretion of company directors and officers. Today, however, they are only part of
that “braided framework”10—one of a number of relevant sources of regulation.11
Corporate codes have become a particularly important aspect of contemporary
corporate governance. These codes, although generally non-binding, create
powerful norms concerning the role of directors and officers and expectations
regarding their use of power. Fiduciary duties and corporate codes operate
holistically and interact in complex and interesting ways. Corporate codes, for
example, provide a matrix in which fiduciary duties operate, and can complement,
or create tensions with, those duties. Yet, as this Article shows, corporate codes are
by no means homogeneous, and substantive differences can often be traced to the
identities of the actors behind the relevant codes.
This Article is structured as follows. Part two provides a snapshot of the
historical basis for classifying company directors and officers as fiduciaries and the
transmission of broadly similar fiduciary law principles applying to company
directors and officers across common law jurisdictions. Part three discusses the
influential law matters hypothesis, and critiques its assumption that there are major
differences between common law and civil law approaches to corporate regulation,
but a unified Anglo-American common law. As part three demonstrates, there are
many significant differences relating to fiduciary duties in the corporate law context
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Part four shifts focus to
examine soft law, specifically the rise of corporate codes and their function as “norm
creators.” It considers the complex ways in which these codes can interact with
directors’ and officers’ duties. Part five concludes, noting that there can be tensions
between the law of fiduciary duties and corporate codes in, for example, the area of
8.

Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
9.
Id.
10. Id.
11. John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3d ed.2017).
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 6 (Jeffrey
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shareholder versus stakeholder interests and rights. The Article concludes by
suggesting that corporate governance codes are likely to increase, rather than
decrease, jurisdictional differences relating to the duties of directors and officers.
II. THE COMMON HERITAGE OF COMMON LAW DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN
CORPORATE LAW
The law relating to fiduciary duties of company directors was historically a
national affair.12 The classification of company directors as “fiduciaries” was a
central pillar of early British law, developing, by analogy, to agents13 and trustees14
who were considered archetypical fiduciaries.15 The famous 1742 U.K. decision in
Charitable Corp. v. Sutton,16 laid the groundwork for modern directors’ duties. In that
case, Lord Hardwicke L.C. stated that “by accepting a trust of this sort, a person is
obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable diligence.”17 Throughout the
nineteenth century, British company law was notoriously laissez-faire18 and fiduciary
duties served as the primary constraint on directors’ discretion and conduct.19
Numerous rationales and justifications have been given for the imposition of
fiduciary duties on particular social actors. Some scholars have stressed the role of
trust, dependence, and vulnerability of the beneficiary in the relationship.20 From a
historical perspective, the imposition of fiduciary duties on company directors and
officers was justifiable under this rationale. At the time of Berle and Means’ seminal
1932 text, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,21 for example, shareholders
were viewed as a dispersed and vulnerable group, in need of legal protection due to

12. See Jennifer G. Hill & Matthew Conaglen, Directors’ Duties and Legal Safe Harbours: A
Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 305 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew
S. Gold eds., 2018).
13. See Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES IN
AGENCY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2018) (stating that, under the common law, “agency
relationships are categorically treated as fiduciary” and noting that the fiduciary character of the agency
relationship is directly linked to the potentially “grave impact” for the principal of the agent’s
actions).
14. Matthew Conaglen, Interaction Between Statutory and General Law Duties Concerning Company
Director Conflicts, 31 CO. & SEC. L.J. 403, 404–05 (2013).
15. Hosp Products Ltd v US Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41, 68 (Austl.).
16. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton (1742) 2 Atk. 400.
17. Id. at 406; see also Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1096–97 (1968); ASIC v. Cassimatis
[No. 8] (2016) FCR 1023, [417] ff (Austl.). According to Sutton’s case, the touchstone for assessing
whether directors had acted with reasonable diligence was the standard of “gross neglect.” See supra text
accompanying note 16.
18. See Brian R. Cheffins, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS
TRANSFORMED, 35, 194, 273 (2008); L. C. B. Gower, The English Private Company, 18 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 535, 536–37 (1953).
19. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat, U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 553–56 (2019).
20. See, e.g., Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in
Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 933 (2011).
21. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
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their inability to act collectively.22 Today, however, the dominant shareholders in
some jurisdictions, including the United States and United Kingdom, are powerful
institutional investors.23 Although these shareholders are hardly vulnerable, the
imposition of fiduciary duties on directors and officers can still be justified on other
rationales, such as the breadth of their discretionary powers24 and their control of
“critical resources belonging to the beneficiary.”25
There are strong similarities in the approach to modern fiduciary duties of
company directors and officers across common law jurisdictions, such as the United
Kingdom, the United States and Australia. Each has equitable and common law
(“general law”) duties applying to directors, that are designed to address Adam
Smith’s classic problems of “negligence and profusion”,26 or, in modern economic
parlance, “agency costs.”27
These broad jurisdictional similarities regarding the duties of company
directors and officers are hardly surprising. They are clear historical examples of
legal transplantation28 whereby the U.K. model of directors’ duties was transmitted
to common law countries around the world.29 In the United States, for instance, the
Delaware Court of Chancery acknowledged directors as fiduciaries in the 1926
decision in Bodell v. General Gas and Electric Corp.,30 providing the basis for Delaware
law’s equitable duties of loyalty and care.31 Australia also took its lead from the
22. Although Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), concerned a two-man joint
venture, its language encapsulates a “shareholder vulnerability” rationale for the imposition of fiduciary
duties on company directors and officers. Meinhard is, however, rarely cited in the public corporation
context by the Delaware courts.
23. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019).
24. Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 367, 379 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
25. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399
(2002). In the corporate law context, technically those resources “belong” to the corporation, which is
also the beneficiary of fiduciary duties.
26. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 313 (1776).
27. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
28. See generally David Cabrelli & Mathias Siems, Convergence, Legal Origins, and Transplants in
Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative Analysis, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 109 (2015). For
discussion of some of the difficulties in transplanting law, see, e.g., Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and
Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-ins: Cultural Distance,
Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 195 (2004); Gunther Teubner,
Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV.
11 (1998).
29. See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE
285, 286 (2008) (arguing that historically legal traditions were spread around the globe primarily by
conquest and colonization. Transmission of British common law principles exemplifies the latter
method of transmission).
30. Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Co., 132 A. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926), aff’d, 140 A.2d 264 (Del. 1927).
See generally Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J. 675,
680–81 (2009).
31. Under modern Delaware law, there was some uncertainty as to whether there existed a
third duty, namely the duty of good faith. It is now accepted, however, that the so-called “duty of good
faith” is not a stand-alone duty, but is rather a component of the broader duty of loyalty. See generally

168

UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L. [Vol. 5:163

United Kingdom with regard to corporate law, including directors’ duties. The 1925
U.K. decision, Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.,32 for example, represented the
leading decision in Australia in the area of directors’ duty of care for over 70 years.
Directors’ “no conflict” and “no profit” duties in Australia were also firmly based
on U.K. case law.33
III. THE LAW MATTERS HYPOTHESIS AND UNCOMMON COMMON LAW
APPROACHES TO DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The broad jurisdictional similarities between the United Kingdom, United
States, and Australia accord with the influential law matters hypothesis, promulgated
by La Porta et al. approximately 20 years ago.34 This hypothesis claimed that the
structure of capital markets around the world is directly linked to a country’s
corporate governance regime. According to the hypothesis, “legal investor
protection is a strong predictor of financial development,”35 and it forecast that
jurisdictions with a high level of minority shareholder protection would develop
deeply dispersed ownership structures.36 “Legal origins” played a central role
because the study concluded that common law jurisdictions, within the British “legal
family,”37 provided stronger minority shareholder protection than civil law
jurisdictions.38 One feature of the common law that the study viewed as particularly
advantageous—and which is central to the development of the law of fiduciary
duties—was the important role of independent judges, who relied on legal reasoning
to decide cases.39
The law matters hypothesis provided support for convergence theory40 via a
process of horizontal imitation. One of the implications of the hypothesis was that

Holland, supra note 30, at 679. For a detailed analysis of the historical development of directors’
fiduciary duties in the United States, see Marcia M. McMurray, Special Project, An Historical Perspective
on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1987).
32. Re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co. [1925] Ch 407. See generally Rosemary Teele Langford et al.,
The Origins of Company Directors’ Statutory Duty of Care, 37 SYDNEY L. REV. 489, 507–08 (2015).
33. Pivotal U.K. cases in this area included, for example, Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros.
(1854) UKHL 1 Paterson 394; Transvaal Lands Co. v. New Belgium (Transvaal) Land and Dev. Co.
[1914] Ch 488; Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554; Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134;
Indus. Dev. Consultant Ltd. v. Cooley [1972] 1 WLR 443.
34. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta
et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).
35. La Porta et al., supra note 29.
36. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], CORP. GOVERNANCE
FACTBOOK 17 (2019) (classifying only four countries, namely the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia and Canada, as having a dispersed ownership structure for listed companies).
37. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1119 (1998) (submitting 18
common law jurisdictions in their original sample, including United States, Canada, Australia, India).
38. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1544–45 (2004).
39. See generally Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 28, at 118–20.
40. For an overview of the convergence theory and the convergence-divergence debate, see
generally CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 28 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-
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jurisdictions with substandard legal rules would follow the siren song of economic
efficiency by voluntarily adopting superior rules.41 The study proved to be
extraordinarily influential in defining a set of problems and solutions42 and had real
world consequences. On the premise that good corporate governance can improve
national economic performance, major international organizations, such as the
OECD, developed model corporate governance codes for ready international
transplantation.43 The World Bank also adopted the methodology of the law matters
study, applying it to a number of working papers, including the bank’s Doing Business
reports.44
In spite of its influence, the law matters hypothesis attracted widespread
academic criticism,45 including criticism of its methodology.46 Commentators also
disputed the study’s stark divide between common law and civil law legal systems,47
and between supposedly flexible judge-made law under a common law system and
rigid codification in civil law jurisdictions.48 Consistent with these critiques, the idea
that directors’ fiduciary duties constitute a unique feature of the common law may
Georg Ringe eds., 2018); Jennifer G. Hill, The Persistent Debate About Convergence in Comparative Corporate
Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 743 (2005).
41. See Hill, supra note 40, at 744.
42. See e.g., Stijn Claessens & Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance and Development—An Update,
10 GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM FOCUS, 1, 11 (2012); Steve Kaplan & Luigi Zingales,
How ‘Law and Finance’ Transformed Scholarship, Debate, CHI. BOOTH REV. (Mar. 5, 2014),
https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/spring-2014/how-law-and-finance-transformed-scho
larship -debate.
43. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], G20/ OECD PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2015) (stating that the principles “help policy makers evaluate and
improve the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for corporate governance, with a view to
supporting economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability”). But cf. Licht, supra note 28,
at 196 (arguing that in the “long and checkered” history of legal transplantation, “direct transplantation
efforts were largely futile in generating Western-like economic growth”).
44. See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 28, at 120. The World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) were already interested in the connection between corporate governance and economic
outcomes. During the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis, the World Bank and the IMF included
corporate governance reform as a condition to financial assistance. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 5;
Timothy Lane et al., IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, 178 Int’l Monetary Fund
Occasional Paper 1, 72–73 (1999); John M. Broder, Asia Pacific Talks Vow Tough Ac tion on Economic
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1997), available at https://www.nytimes.com/19 97/11/26/world/asiapacific-talks-vow-tough-action-on-economic-crisis.html.
45. See Claessens & Yurtoglu, supra note 42, at 12.
46. See, e.g., Holger Spamann, The “AntiDirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. (ISSUE
2) 467 (2010). La Porta et al. responded to methodological criticism of their original study in several
later papers. See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 28, at 123.
47. See Skeel, supra note 38, at 1546; Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A
Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 799 n.27 (2002).
48. See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 28, at 117–18 (arguing that common law and civil law are
regarded as diverging with respect to “their relevant sources of law and legal methods” and stating that
whereas common law judges are considered to solve individual disputes by deductive reasoning, civil
law judges are regarded as “law-appliers”, who are expected to follow codified rules); see, e.g., Cally
Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983, 1005, nn.66–68 (2005) (arguing
that the distinction between common law and civil law under the law matters hypothesis is overgeneralized, and that the jurisdictional line between these two forms of regulation is far more blurred
in practice).
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be misleading, given that functional equivalents to fiduciary duties exist in civil law
jurisdictions.49
In addition to exaggerating the differences between common law and civil law
legal families, the law matters hypothesis also arguably overstated the similarities
within the common law world itself.50 Although it is often assumed that there is a
unified Anglo-American approach (and a unified Anglo-Australian approach),
significant differences appear across these jurisdictions when one shifts from a
general, to a more granular, level.51
First, U.S. and U.K. corporate law had different organizational starting points,
which led to different corporate law trajectories, including in the area of directors’
duties.52 Whereas the organizational origins of U.S. corporate law were British royal
chartered corporations, which had strong quasi-public roots,53 British company law
derived from unincorporated joint stock (or “deed of settlement”) companies,
which were quintessentially private bodies.54 These different organizational origins
affected the scope of directors’ discretion and the role of fiduciary duties.55
Second, whereas under Delaware law, all duties owed by directors, including
the duty of care, tend to be classified as “fiduciary”,56 U.K. and Australian judicial
decisions have adopted a narrower view of fiduciary duties,57 emphasizing that only
proscriptive duties (or duties requiring “self-denial”)58 are fiduciary in nature.59 On

49. See, e.g., Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Fiduciary Principles in European Civil Law
Jurisdictions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 583 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
In the Asian civil law context, see Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189 (2000).
50. See, e.g., Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative
Analysis of the UK and US, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L (NUMBER 3) 147, 147–48 (2006); Steven
Toms & Mike Wright, Divergence and Convergence within Anglo-American Corporate Governance Systems: Evidence
from the US and UK, 1950–2000, 47 BUS. HIST. (NUMBER 2) 267, 267–68 (2005).
51. Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s Migration to Delaware,
63 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2010).
52. See generally Hill, supra note 19, at 541–47.
53. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 159 (2019); Hill, supra note
19, at 541–44; L.C.B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L.
REV. (NUMBER 8) 1369, 1370–72 (1956). As a result, most early U.S. chartered businesses were regarded
as “public agencies.” See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800: Part I, 2
HARV. L. REV. 105, 110–11 (1888); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business
Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945). In Britain, royal chartered companies reflected the theory
that the corporate form was a body, approved by the state to act in “the national interest.” See C.A.
COOKE, CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL HISTORY 78 (1950).
54. Unincorporated deed of settlement companies were effectively large partnerships with
strong contractual elements, which also made creative use of trust law to artificially replicate the benefits
of incorporation. See John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American
Business History, 116 COLUM. 2145, 2157–66 (2016). See generally Hill, supra note 19, at 544–47.
55. See generally Hill, supra note 19, at 541.
56.
See MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE
PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 13 (2010).
57.
See Conaglen, supra note 14, at 405.
58.
Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 49.
59.
See also Honourable T.F. Bathurst, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Director’s, Trustee and Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Domestic Corporate Arrangements, Address
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this more restrictive interpretation, only the “no conflict” and “no profit” duties
qualify as fiduciary. Other duties, including the duty of care60 and the duty to act in
good faith in the best interests of the company, are non-fiduciary in nature.61 This
difference in classification can affect the remedies available for breach of duty.
Third, in relation to the duty of loyalty, there is no equivalent under U.K. or
Australian case law to the U.S. concept of “entire fairness.”62 U.K. and Australian
courts are simply not permitted to evaluate directors’ conduct from the perspective
of fairness.63 Also, whereas independent directors in the United States, have played
a significant role as a sanitizing device for approving conflicts of interest,64 U.K.
and Australian company law primarily reserved this role for shareholders.65
Fourth, the sources of directors’ duty vary in contemporary corporate law
across common law jurisdictions. In Delaware, directors’ fiduciary duties, in
accordance with their ancestry, are purely equitable.66 Modern U.K. and Australian
law, on the other hand, encompass statutory directors’ duties, which interact
differently with general law fiduciary duties.67 Under the U.K. model, directors’
statutory duties, which were introduced in 2006,68 eradicate and replace the general
law principles,69 but are not necessarily co-extensive with those general law
principles. Section 172(1) of 2006 U.K. Companies Act,70 for example, creates a
statutory directors’ duty that appears to lack any prior general law counterpart. The
provision requires directors to act in the way that they consider, in good faith, is
“most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members

at the Annual Family Law Conference Hobart, Tasmania (Oct. 13, 2012) (citing Breen v Williams (1996)
186 CLR 71, 93, 137 (Austl.); Pilmer v Duke Grp Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 165, 270–71 (Austl.)).
60.
Cf. J.D. Heydon, Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and Skill Fiduciary?, in
EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 185 (Simone Degeling & James Edelman eds., 2005); William M. Heath,
The Director’s “Fiduciary” Duty of Care and Skill: A Misnomer, 25 CO. & SEC. L.J. 370 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Aequitas Ltd v AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 14, 284 (Austl.).
62. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors’
Self-Interested Transactions, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (1999). Cf., however, Andrew F. Tuch,
Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (2019) (arguing that the
divide between the U.K. and the U.S. approaches to the duty of loyalty in relation to self- dealing is less
sharp in practice than often assumed).
63. Aberdeen Ry. Co. v Blaikie Bros., (1854) 1 Macq 461.
64. See James D. Cox, Corporate Governance in the United States: The Evolving Role of the Independent
Board, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ASIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE 379, 388 (Low Chee Keong ed.,
2002) (stating that “[t]he most noticeable aspect of American corporate governance is the law’s repeated
resort to the independent director as a cleansing agent.”).
65. See Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; Furs Ltd. v Tomkies [1936] 54 CLR 583
(Austl.); Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 666 (Austl.); see also Corporations Act 2001
ch 2E (Austl.) (regarding authorization of related party transactions).
66. See generally Holland, supra note 30, at 677–78.
67. See generally Hill & Conaglen, supra note 12.
68. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 pt. 10 ch. 2 (UK).
69. Yet, in an interesting example of statutory interpretation, the U.K. legislation states that the
statutory directors’ duties should be interpreted in accordance with these now-defunct general law
principles. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 170(4) (UK).
70. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 172(1) (UK).
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as a whole.”71 Adopting an “enlightened shareholder value” approach to corporate
governance,72 the section states that, in fulfilling this duty, directors must consider
the interests of a non-exhaustive list of stakeholders and the impact of corporate
actions on the community and the environment.73 Australia’s statutory directors’
duty scheme is quite different from the U.K. model in that its statutory duties74 are
“additive to the general law rather than substitutionary.”75 Also, Australian
lawmakers considered, but rejected the need to introduce any statutory duty
involving stakeholder interests, akin to section 172(1) of the U.K. Act.76
Fifth, the scope of the safe harbors providing protection for breach of duty
by directors differs across these jurisdictions.77 This disparity is particularly evident
in the context of the duty of care.78 In Delaware, directors receive a high level of
protection against monetary liability for breach of the duty of care as a result of the
capacious U.S. business judgment rule,79 combined with legislative approval, under
71. See id. See generally GOWER: PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 501–04 (Paul L.
Davies & Sarah Worthington eds., 10th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GOWER].
72. See GOWER, supra note 71, at 502–03; see also Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of
the Company: Is it Fit for Purpose in a Post-Financial Crisis World?, in DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 50, 60 (Joan Loughrey ed.,
2013); Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s
“Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach,” 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577 (2007).
73. See generally GOWER, supra note 71. In spite of this apparently “public” focus in § 172(1),
however, the duty remains firmly shareholder-oriented in practice, because the U.K. statutory directors’
duties are owed to the company, and enforceable only by the company, or its shareholders in derivative
suit. Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 170(1) (UK); Virginia E. Harper Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value:
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder- Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 79 (2010).
74. See Corporations Act 2001 ss 180–184 (Austl.).
75. See G.F.K. Santow, Codification of Directors’ Duties, 73 AUSTL. L.J. 336 (1999) (noting that,
historically, Australia has placed more emphasis on corporate legislation than the United Kingdom).
Australian corporate legislation explicitly preserves the operation of directors’ general law duties
alongside the statutory duties. See Corporations Act 2001 s 185 (Austl.). Also, the duties in these parallel
regimes are not necessarily coterminous. See Jason Harris et al., Shareholder Primacy Revisited: Does the Public
Interest Have Any Role in Statutory Duties?, 26 CO. & SEC. L.J. 355, 361 et seq. (2008).
76. Two Australian government reports rejected calls to introduce a statutory provision like §
172(1) of the U.K. Companies Act (2006), on the basis that the U.K. provision was overly prescriptive,
unnecessary, and would result in confusion in the Australian context. See Parliament of Australia,
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (“PJC”), Corporate Responsibility:
Managing Risk and Creating Value (2006); Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, The Social
Responsibility of Corporations: Report (2006).
77. See generally Hill & Conaglen, supra note 12.
78. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 519 (2012).
79. The U.S. business judgment rule assumes that the directors, in making a business decision,
have acted “on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.” See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also
Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that the U.S.
business judgment rule will protect directors, provided they “act in good faith and meet minimal
proceduralist standards of attention”). There has been academic debate in the United States as to
whether the duty of care is shaped by the business judgment rule, or is doctrinally separate from, and
merely protected by, the business judgment rule. For the latter approach, see Lyman Johnson, The Modest
Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW 625 (2000); D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 83 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff
Solomon eds., 2016).
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Del GCL § 102(b)(7), of charter exculpation provisions that exclude liability for
negligence, including gross negligence.80 The breadth of this protection has attracted
criticism in recent times.81 Indeed, even aspects of the duty of loyalty, long treated
as the immutable core of fiduciary obligation in Delaware,82 can now be waived
under Delaware law.83
In the United Kingdom and Australia, the protection offered to directors for
breach of fiduciary duty, including the duty of care, is far less generous. The United
Kingdom has no business judgment rule84 and Australia’s statutory business
judgment rule,85 although ostensibly modeled on the U.S. version,86 operates in an
extremely narrow way as a result of judicial interpretation.87 Whereas U.S. statutory
provisions, such as § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware code, expressly authorize companies
to exculpate directors from liability for negligence, U.K. and Australian legislation
expressly prohibits such exoneration.88

80. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001). Some U.S. states, however, go
further than Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) regarding the scope of permissible exculpation. For example,
Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) only authorizes exoneration of directors, while other states, such as Nevada,
Louisiana and New Jersey, also authorize protection of company officers. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §
78.037(2) (2013); LA Stat. Ann. § 12:24(C)(4) (2011); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14A:2–7(3) (2013).
81. See, e.g., John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 35, 61 (2014) (arguing that that where systemic risk exists, the U.S. business judgment rule
can promote excessive risk-taking by directors and officers of financial institutions, justifying the
imposition of liability rules); Holger Spamann, Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 337, 339 (2016) (arguing that the complete exclusion of liability for breach of the duty of
care in the United States is not necessarily justified by standard policy rationales and should be
reassessed).
82. See Holland, supra note 30, at 687.
83. Del. Code tit. 8, § 122(17) was amended in 2000 to permit waiver of the corporate
opportunity doctrine. See generally Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Eric L. Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary
Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017).
See also Leo E. Strine & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11,
12 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015) (discussing the growing trend toward waiver
of the corporate opportunity doctrine in the context of limited liability companies (LLCs) and limited
partnerships (LPs)).
84. Although the concept of a business judgment rule is alien to U.K. company law, U.K.
judges are, however, reluctant to hold directors liable for honest mistakes of judgment. See, e.g., Howard
Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821, 835; Turquand v. Marshall, (1869) LR 4 Ch App
376, 386; Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 c. 392; see also M.J. Trebilcock, The Liability
of Company Directors for Negligence, 32 MOD. L. REV. 499, 500 (1969); André Tunc, The Judge and the
Businessman, 102 L.Q.R. 549 (1986).
85. Corporations Act 2001 s 180(2) (Austl.).
86. Australia’s statutory business judgment rule, which was introduced in 2000, is found in
180(2) of the Corporations Act 2001. For background regarding the introduction of the statutory
business judgment rule in Australia, see Mark Byrne, Directors to Hide from a Sea of Liabilities in a New Safe
Harbour, 22 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 255 (2008).
87. In contrast to its U.S. counterpart, the courts have interpreted the Australian statutory
business judgment rule in such a way as to place the onus of proof on the defendant directors, rather
than on the plaintiff. See, e.g., ASIC v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1; ASIC v Fortescue Metals Grp Ltd (2011) 190
FCR 364; ASIC v Mariner Corp Ltd [2015] FCA 589.
88. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 232(1) (UK); Corporations Act 2001 ss 199A–199C (Austl.).
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Finally, enforcement mechanisms for breach of directors’ duties differ across
these three common law jurisdictions. Delaware and the United Kingdom both rely
primarily on private enforcement of directors’ duties.89 Although a high percentage
of civil actions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery involve questions of
fiduciary duty,90 only those involving breach of the duty of loyalty tend to succeed,
given the legal safe harbors available for negligence. In the United Kingdom, on the
other hand, very little private litigation for breach of directors’ duties is ever
commenced due to procedural obstacles.91
Australia diverges radically from both Delaware and the United Kingdom in
the area of enforcement of directors’ duties because it adopts a primarily public
enforcement model for breach of the statutory duties of directors and officers.92
This regime enables the business regulator, the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC), to bring legal actions for contravention of the
statutory duties. It appears that this mode of enforcement has affected the substance
of directors’ duties in Australia, shifting them away from the private to the public
realm.93 ASIC and the courts have, for example, stated that these statutory duties
are closely interlinked with the “public interest”94 and that breach of the duties
constitutes, not only a private, but also a public wrong.95 In the wake of a recent
high profile Banking Royal Commission96 in Australia, ASIC has indicated that it
intends to use its enforcement powers in this area more aggressively in the future.97

89. In Delaware, for example, actions for breach of fiduciary duty can be brought by the
company, or by shareholders in direct suits, derivative litigation or, most commonly, by means of class
actions. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: AcquisitionOriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167–69 (2004). In the U.K. context, there are, however,
some aspects of public enforcement. See John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An
Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J EMP. LEGAL STUD. 687, 716–17 (2009).
90. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 89, at 165 et seq.
91. A number of procedural differences make the United Kingdom a less hospitable
jurisdiction for corporate litigation than Delaware. For example, class actions and contingency fees are
available in Delaware, but not the United Kingdom, which moreover operates on a “loser pays” basis.
See Armour et. al., supra note 89, at 692–93.
92. Although historically, Australia had a U.K.-style private enforcement model, this changed
in 1993, when it introduced the statutory “civil penalty regime.” This is a distinctive public enforcement
regime for certain contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001, including the statutory directors’
duties. For the full list of civil penalty provisions, including the statutory directors’ duties, see
Corporations Act 2001 s 1317E (Austl.).
93. See Michelle Welsh, Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Civil Penalty
Enforcement in Australia, 42 FED. L. REV. 217, 223–28 (2014); Harris et al., supra note 75.
94. See AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, ASIC’S APPROACH TO
ENFORCEMENT, Information Sheet 151 (Sept. 2013), 6.
95. See, e.g., ASIC v Cassimatis [No. 8] (2016) FCA 1023, [455], [461], [496] ff, [503] (Aug. 26,
2016).
96. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ROYAL COMMISSION INTO MISCONDUCT IN THE
BANKING, SUPERANNUATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, Final Report, Vol. 1 (2019).
97. In the Financial Services Royal Commission’s Final Report, Commissioner Hayne stated
that the regulator’s first question, upon becoming aware of any entity’s breach of the law, should be
“Why not litigate?” Id. at 427. It is anticipated that this will result in a far greater volume of litigation,
including for breach of statutory directors’ duties, in the future. See, e.g., Michael Pelly, ASIC Set for
Hayne Court Blitz, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Aug. 19, 2019); see also AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND
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IV. CODES, NORMS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The behavior of corporate actors is not only shaped by enforceable laws. It is
also shaped by social norms and governance practices, which may indeed be more
important in this respect than formal legal rules.98 Norms can interact in complex
ways with fiduciary law99 to drive greater convergence or divergence across
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the lines between formal legal rules and norms can
sometimes be blurred and hard to define,100 and there can be movement in either
direction between so-called “hard law”, comprising enforceable legal rules, and
“soft law”, encompassing norms.101
Corporate governance codes have proliferated around the world in recent
decades.102 They have focused greater attention on norms and governance practices,
many of which intersect with the dictates of fiduciary duties. These codes operate
in a parallel universe to corporate law. They can, nonetheless, affect the scope of
directors’ discretion, the nature of their fiduciary obligations and enforcement
practices. Codes epitomize the shift from corporate law to corporate governance, a
shift from “from legal rules standing alone to legal rules interacting with non-legal
processes and institutions.” 103
Corporate governance codes are by no means uniform across jurisdictions
and, in some countries, have been subject to almost continuous amendment.104 The
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, ASIC Enforcement Update: January to June 2019, Report No, 625 (Aug. 19,
2019), 3.
98. Another criticism sometimes made of La Porta et al.’s law matters hypothesis is that it
focused solely on legal rules and failed to recognise the important role played by social norms and
governance practices. See generally John C. Coffee, Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 2151, 2154 et seq. (2001).
99. See generally Matthew Harding, Fiduciary Law and Social Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 797, 797–99 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
100. See Coffee, supra note 98. Cf. however, a recent U.K. corporate governance dispute, which
relied on a clear distinction between legal rules and norms. In 2019, Daejan Holdings (“Daejan”)
constituted the only listed U.K. company without any women on its board of directors. It was reported
that, Sir Philip Hampton, leader of a government review to increase the number of women in United
Kingdom listed company boardrooms, wrote to Daejan calling on it to alter its all-male board policy,
in accordance with prevailing corporate governance norms. According to the report, Daejan’s response
stated, “Whilst we appreciate the views of your review body they are not enshrined in law or any formal
regulation and we are not obliged to comply with them.” See Helen Cahill, Inside the VERY Secret
Boardroom that’s Firmly CLOSED to Women, DAILY MAIL (June 3, 2019),
https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/markets/article-7095981/Inside-secret-Daejan-Holdings -bo
ardroom-thats-firmly-CLOSED-women.html.
101. E.g., although the appointment of independent directors listed public company boards
was a prevalent practice in the United States, there was no specific rule requiring this practice prior to
the introduction of the New York Exchange Stock Exchange corporate governance rules following the
Enron and WorldCom scandals. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, § 303A (2003).
102. See Alice Klettner, Corporate Governance Codes and Gender Diversity: Management-Based
Regulation in Action, 39 U.N.S.W. L.J. 715 (2016) (noting that in 1999, 24 countries were reported to have
a code of corporate governance in place, compared to 64 countries in 2008, and 93 countries in 2015).
The full list of current international codes is available on the European Corporate Governance Institute
(ECGI) website at https://ecgi.global/content/codes.
103. Gilson, supra note 8.
104. See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International
Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 10 (2011) (criticizing the “fast-paced, code changes” in Germany).
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provisions of these codes sometimes complement and bolster key directors’
duties.105 For example, corporate governance codes typically stress the need for
independent directors106 as a means of providing procedural protection against
managerial conflicts of interest. However, in other instances, code provisions may
create tension with established principles of fiduciary law. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the context of shareholder versus stakeholder rights and interests.
The blueprint for the international corporate governance codes is the U.K.
Corporate Governance Code, which can be traced back to the 1992 Cadbury
Committee.107 These codes are typically non-binding, yet they can create powerful
norms. They emanate from a variety of sources, including government agencies,
stock exchanges and business organizations,108 and this can itself affect the norms
they create. The content of these codes differs considerably as does their
enforcement and administration.109
The corporate governance codes of the United States, the United Kingdom
and Australia reflect interesting differences in their approach to several key issues
related to fiduciary duties, including the thorny question, which has underpinned
corporate law since the time of the famous Berle-Dodd debate, as to whom
directors owe their duties.110 This debate has been described as a “clash between
the different visions of corporatism”,111 exemplifying the tension between a public
and private image of the corporation.112
105. See, e.g., ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
RECOMMENDATIONS 15 n.39 (2019), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/regulation/cgcprinciples-and-recommendations-fourth-edn.pdf (explicitly referencing a leading Australian case on the
duty of care, ASIC v Healey [2011] FCA 717 (June 27, 2011), in its discussion of induction of new
directors).
106. See ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 13–15 (Recommendations
2.3 and 2.4). Note, however, that there are many differences in the interpretation of “independence”
across jurisdictions. See generally INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL
AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2017).
107. SIR ADRIAN CADBURY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1992).
108. Hopt, supra note 104, at 12.
109. Id. at 13–15.
110. Professors Berle and Dodd both considered that directors were “trustees”; however, they
strongly disagreed on two other matters closely tied to directors’ duties: (i) the theoretical nature of the
corporation and (ii) the identity of the beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties. Berle adopted a private
aggregate theory of the corporation, which supported his claim that directors held their powers in trust
for shareholders. Dodd, on the other hand, regarded the corporation as a public institution, arguing
that directors owed their duties to a diverse group of stakeholders, including employees, creditors, and
consumers. See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931)
[hereinafter Berle, Corporate Powers]; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, Note]. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Then and Now: Professor Berle
and the Unpredictable Shareholder, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1005, 1009–10 (2010).
111. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf
Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 124 (2008).
112. See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Concept of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992). The Berle-Dodd debate laid the groundwork for the persistent debate
concerning shareholder primacy versus stakeholder theory. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects
of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003 (2013).
AND
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This public-private tension continues in corporate law and corporate
governance today. Under traditional Anglo-Australian case law, directors have owed
their duties to “the company as a whole,” which has generally been interpreted to
mean the shareholders as a general body, rather than the corporation as a
commercial entity.113
Corporate governance codes, on the other hand, often display greater variation
and emphasis concerning their “visions of corporatism.”114 There are several
different categories of code, which can affect content. Codes are sometimes: (i)
purely voluntary and self-regulatory; (ii) linked to public authorities; or (iii)
promulgated by stock exchanges to provide listed companies with a blueprint for
“good corporate governance.”115
These diverse origins can result in major differences concerning the stringency
and enforceability of these corporate governance codes.116 They can also affect the
emphasis given to shareholder or stakeholder interests. Variations can often be
traced to the identity of the actors behind the relevant code. For example, the U.S.
Corporate Governance Principles,117 which were issued in January 2017, are an
example of the first category of code. The U.S. Corporate Governance Principles
are a set of six voluntary principles adopted by the Investor Stewardship Group
(“ISG”).118 The ISG is a collective of some of the largest U.S.-based and
international asset owners and managers. Signatories to the principles include, not
only “the Big Three” fund managers (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global
Advisers),119 but also some activist hedge funds (ValueAct Capital and Trian
Partners).120 Not surprisingly, given the origins and identity of the actors behind the
code, the U.S. Corporate Governance Principles assert that directors are directly
113. See, e.g., Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425, 438 (Austl.) (citing the decision of
Evershed M.R. in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286, 291 (UK)). See generally J.D.
Heydon, Directors’ Duties and the Company’s Interests, in EQUITY AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 120
(P.D. Finn ed., 1987). However, the courts have at times stated that there will be exceptions to this
basic principle. For example, in The Bell Grp Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp [No. 9] (2008) WASC 239,
para 4393 (Austl.), Owen J. stated: “This does not mean that the general body of shareholders is always
and for all purposes the embodiment of ‘the company as a whole.’ It will depend on the context,
including the type of company and the nature of the impugned activity or decision. . . In my view the
interests of shareholders and the interests of the company may be seen as correlative not because the
shareholders are the company but, rather, because the interests of the company and the interests of the
shareholders intersect.”
114. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 111.
115. See Eddy Wymeersch, Corporate Governance Codes and Their Implementation 2–3 (Fin. Law Inst.,
Working Paper 2006–10, Sept. 2006).
116. See Hopt, supra note 104, at 13–15.
117. Inv’r Stewardship Grp., Corporate Governance Principles for U.S. Listed Companies, https://
www.isgframework.org/corporate-governance-principles/ [hereinafter ISG corporate Governance
Principles].
118.
See Inv’r Stewardship Grp., About the Investor Stewardship Group and the Framework for U.S.
Stewardship and Governance, https://isgframework.org/.
119.
See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POLITICS 298 (2017); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note
23.
120. For the full list of signatories to the ISG Corporate Governance Principles and ISG Stewardship
Principles, see https://isgframework.org/signatories-and-endorsers/.
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accountable to shareholders.121 Furthermore, they state that shareholders should
have participatory rights in corporate governance, and boards should be responsive
to shareholders’ viewpoints.122 These principles reflect a strongly private,
shareholder-focused conception of directors’ duties.123
The origins of the U.K. and Australian corporate governance codes differ
from the U.S. Corporate Governance Principles. The U.K. Corporate Governance
Code falls within the second category of corporate governance code described
above. It is administered by the U.K. Financial Reporting Council (FRC), an
independent regulator, which, with the backing of the British government,124 seeks
to “promote transparency and integrity in business.”125 Australia’s corporate
governance principles represent the third category of code. They are drafted and
promulgated by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance
Council, which comprises a group of industry stakeholders.126
Recent amendments to the U.K. and Australian corporate governance codes
represent a far more public conception of the corporation, and correspondingly,
directors’ responsibilities than the U.S. Corporate Governance Principles.127 The
U.K. and Australian corporate governance codes also clearly recognize that financial
under-performance is not the only problem in modern corporate law, and that
issues relating to organizational integrity are also critical. The 2018 U.K. Corporate
Governance Code notes, for example, that the role of a successful company is not
only to create value for shareholders, but also to contribute to “wider society.”128 It
states that that directors must lead by example to establish a culture of integrity129
that is aligned with the organization’s “purpose, values and strategy.”130
The 2018 U.K. Corporate Governance Code also pays heightened attention
to stakeholder interests, particularly those of employees. The code bolsters the
statutory directors’ duty in section 172(1) of the U.K. Companies Act 2006, but also
121. See ISG Corporate Governance Principles, supra note 117 (“Principle 1: Boards are accountable
to shareholders.”).
122.
See id. (“Principle 2: Shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their
economic interest. Principle 3: Boards should be responsive to shareholders and be proactive in order
to understand their perspectives.”); see also Inv’r Stewardship Grp., The Principles: Stewardship
Framework for Institutional Investors, https://isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/.
123. See Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 110; Berle, Note, supra note 110.
124. See Fin. Reporting Council, About the FRC, https://www.frc.org.uk/about-the-frc.
125. The FRC’s Board of Directors is appointed by the U.K. Secretary of State for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy. Fin. Reporting Council, FRC Board, https://www.frc.org.uk/about- thefrc/structure-of-the-frc/frc-board.
126. See ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 1 (About the Council).
127. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 111.
128. The UK Corporate Governance Code 4 (2018), available at https://www.frc.org.uk/
getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK
Corporate-Governance-CodeFINAL.pdf (Principle A).
129. Id. at 1, 4 (Principle B).
130. Id. at 4 (Principle B). The British Academy’s influential research project on the “Future of
the Corporation” also focuses on the importance of corporate culture and “societal purpose.” See THE
BRITISH ACADEMY, FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION: RESEARCH SUMMARIES 26–27, 32–33, 48–49
(2018),
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Future%20of%20the%20
Corporation%20Research%20Summaries%20-%20British%20Academy.pdf.

2020]

SHIFTING CONTOURS

179

goes further than legislation in the norms it creates. First, the code states that the
board should describe in the company’s annual report how the interests of
stakeholders have been considered in board decision-making131 and should
“understand the views” of non-shareholder stakeholders.132 Secondly, whereas
section 172(1) involves protection of stakeholder interests,133 the 2018 amendments
to the code promote use of structural features to ensure actual participation in
corporate governance by employees.134 The U.K. code now outlines three
alternative methods for ensuring workforce engagement in corporate governance:
the appointment of an employee director, establishment of a formal workforce
advisory panel, or designation of a non-executive director with responsibility for
workforce related issues.135
Australia’s 2019 Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations
(“ASX corporate governance code”),136 replicates this U.K. trend towards more
emphasis on organizational integrity and corporate responsibilities to the public. A
2018 Consultation Draft137 of proposed changes to the code included a specific
reference to a listed entity’s “social licence to operate.”138 The Consultation Draft
also stated that directors and managers were expected to consider the views and
interests of, and engage with, a wide variety of stakeholders.139 These proposed
revisions were the subject of widespread backlash in the business community.
Critics argued that these changes would directly conflict with existing Australian law
regarding directors’ and officers’ duties,140 emphasizing that Australia lacks any

131. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2018), supra note 128, at 1, 5.
132. Id.
133. It is also noteworthy that this protection is limited under section 172(1), in the sense that
the directors are only required to consider the interests of stakeholders to the extent that such
consideration is likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.
See GOWER, supra note 71, at 501–02.
134. See the UK Corporate Governance Code (2018), supra note 128, at 1, 5.
135. The UK Corporate Governance Code states that, “[i]f the board has not chosen one or
more of these methods, it should explain what alternative arrangements are in place and why it considers
that they are effective.” Id. at 5.
136. ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 105.
137. ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4TH EDITION CONSULTATION DRAFT (2018), https://www.asx.com.au/
documents/asx-compliance/consultation-draft-cgc-4th-edition.pdf.
138. Id.; see also Bryan Horrigan, Does Corporate Performance Now Include a Social Licence to Operate?,
AUSTL. INST. OF COMPANY DIRECTORS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/
advocacy/governance-leadership-centre/governance-driving-performance/does-corporate-perfor
mance- now-include-a-social-licence-to-operate.
139. See ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 137, at 25.
140. In addition to the argument that the expression “social licence to operate” was contrary
to Australian law concerning directors’ duties, critics stated that the phrase was vague, uncertain,
subjective, a product of political correctness, and potentially unfair to companies in certain industries,
such as gaming, alcohol, tobacco and mining. See, e.g., Patrick Durkin, Board Outrage Over Push to Have a
Social Licence, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Aug. 1, 2018); AUSTL. INST. OF CO. DIRS., SUBMISSION TO THE
REVIEW OF THE ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2018);
Janet Albrechtsen, There’s a Corporate Rebellion Brewing Over Fanatical Social Justice Movements, THE AUSTL.
(Aug. 4, 2018); Anne Davies, Corporate Australia is Locked in a Culture War, But It’s Not About Left and
Right, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2018).
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statutory directors’ duty relating to stakeholder interests analogous to section 172(1)
of the U.K. Companies Act.141
The final version of the 2019 ASX corporate governance code, which was
released in February 2019, wound back several of the more controversial features
of the draft code. In particular, it jettisoned the references to a listed company’s
“social licence to operate.” Nonetheless, in launching the new code, the Chair of
the ASX Corporate Governance Council noted that the controversial expression
had been replaced by “essentially synonymous”142 terms, such as “reputation” and
“standing in the community.”143 She also noted that, in the wake of the Australian
Banking Royal Commission Final Report, the ASX Corporate Governance Council
considered it “imperative that listed entities align their culture and values with
community expectations to help arrest the loss of trust in business.”144
Shareholder stewardship codes (“stewardship codes”) are another more recent
variety of corporate governance code. Stewardship codes originated in the United
Kingdom in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.145 They exemplify the
important link between problem framing and regulatory outcomes.146 For example,
a common view in the United States was that shareholders contributed to the global
financial crisis, by placing pressure on corporate managers to engage in excessive
risk-taking to increase profitability.147 But, the reverse view prevailed in the United
Kingdom, where the real problem during the crisis was perceived to be the failure
of institutional investors to provide a counterweight to managerial risk-taking, by

141. See Will Heath & Lauren Beasley, Proposed Fourth Edition of ASX Corporate Governance
Principles, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Jun. 6, 2018); cf. AUSTL. INST. OF CO. DIRS., FORWARD
GOVERNANCE AGENDA: LIFTING STANDARDS AND PRACTICE 17 (2019).
142. Elizabeth Johnstone, Chair, ASX Corp. Governance Council, Address at the ASX
Corporate Governance Council: Launch of the 4th Edition of the Corporate Governance Principles &
Recommendations (Feb. 27, 2019) at 4.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 5.
145. The first stewardship code was adopted in the United Kingdom in 2010 in response to
the global financial crisis. See The U.K. Stewardship Code, (2010). A revised version of the Code, which
operates on a voluntary basis, was released in 2012. See The U.K. Stewardship Code, (2012). In January
2019, the Financial Reporting Council published a draft of proposed revisions to the Stewardship Code,
designed to strengthen the code. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, PROPOSED REVISION TO THE U.K.
STEWARDSHIP CODE (2019). In October 2019, the Financial Reporting Council published the 2020
Stewardship Code, taking effect from January 1, 2020. See Baker McKenzie, The Stewardship Code 2020:
Is This an Opportunity for Listed Companies to Increase Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement? (Nov. 11, 2019).
146. See generally Hill, supra note 6; Tim Bowley & Jennifer G. Hill, Stewardship and Collective
Action: The Australian Experience, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES,
CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press) (forthcoming 2020), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/18/stewardship-andcollective-action-the-australian-experience/.
147. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799 (2011).
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participating in corporate governance.148 The U.K. Stewardship Code149 was
designed to address this problem, on the basis that “[e]ffective stewardship benefits
companies, investors and the economy as a whole.”150
Since the time of the global financial crisis, more than twenty countries have
followed the United Kingdom’s lead by adopting stewardship codes, and that
number is growing.151 Asian jurisdictions, in particular, have been eager to embrace
the shareholder stewardship concept.152 This is in spite of the fact that the capital
market structure in many Asian countries is fundamentally different from U.K.
capital market structure. Whereas in the United Kingdom the vast majority of shares
of publicly listed companies are held by institutional investors,153 in Asia, the
opposite is true. Asian listed companies typically have concentrated ownership
structures, with family members or the state as controlling blockholders.154

148. According to the Walker Review, a lack of institutional investor engagement with UK
banks was a key governance problem in relation to the global financial crisis. WALKER REVIEW, A
REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY
ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 72 (2009) (stating that “[w]ith hindsight it seems clear that the
board and director shortcomings. . .would have been tackled more effectively had there been more
vigorous scrutiny and engagement by major investors acting as owners.”).
149. See U.K. Stewardship Code (2012); U.K. Stewardship Code (2020).
150. U.K. Stewardship Code (2012), 1, ¶ 1. Cf the 2020 version of the code, stating that
stewardship leads to “sustainable benefits for the economy, the environment and society”: U.K.
Stewardship Code 2020, 4. Although the U.K. Stewardship Code originally operated on a voluntary,
“comply or explain” basis, the U.K. Stewardship Code 2020 now comprises a set of “apply and explain”
Principles. See supra.
151. More than twenty countries have now adopted shareholder stewardship codes. For a list
of jurisdictions that have to date adopted stewardship code or analogous initiatives, see Alice Klettner,
Stewardship Codes and Shareholder Participation in Governance, 70 GOVERNANCE DIRECTIONS 227, 228–29,
Table 1 (2018).
152. Jurisdictions in Asia which have adopted a form of stewardship code to date include:
Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. Id. A stewardship code
has also been proposed for India. See Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Report of the
Committee on Corporate Governance, at 93–94 (Oct. 5, 2017); see also Amarjeet Singh, Executive Director of
SEBI, Keynote Speech and Panel Discussion at the NSE-IGIDR Conference on Corporate
Governance, Edited Transcript of Keynote Speech and Panel Discussion, at 21–24 (June 21, 2018). In December
2019, SEBI adopted a stewardship code for mutual funds and alternative investment funds (AIFs),
which is due to come into effect on April 1, 2020. See SEBI Puts in Place Stewardship Code for Mutual Funds,
AIFs, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (India) (Dec. 24, 2019).
153. In the United Kingdom, around 90% of shares are held by financial institutions and
approximately half of these are non-UK-based. See, e.g., Paul L. Davies, Shareholders in the United Kingdom,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 355, 356 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas
eds., 2015); HOUSE OF COMMONS BUSINESS, ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FOURTH REPORT OF SESSION 2016–17, at §§ 13–16.
154. In a controlling blockholder context, which is the main paradigm for Asian listed
companies, increasing shareholder rights or responsibilities may be irrelevant as an accountability
device. See Luh Luh Lan & Umakanth Varottil, Shareholder Empowerment in Controlled Companies: The Case
of Singapore, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 572 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S.
Thomas eds., 2015); Dan W. Puchniak & Samantha Tang, Singapore’s Puzzling Embrace of Shareholder
Stewardship: A Successful Secret, VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming); Kon Sik Kim, Dynamics of
Shareholder Power in Korea, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 535 (Jennifer G. Hill
& Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).

182

UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L. [Vol. 5:163

Like corporate governance codes, stewardship codes emanate from different
issuing bodies.155 In some jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Japan,
stewardship codes are issued by regulators or quasi-regulators.156 In others, such as
South Korea and South Africa, stewardship codes are promulgated by industry
players.157 Finally, some countries, including Australia, Canada and the United
States, have stewardship codes initiated by investors themselves.158 These
differences in origin can influence the effectiveness of a particular code.159 It can
also affect the extent to which a stewardship code tolerates or encourages
shareholder activism, including collective activism.160 Also, the regulatory goals for
introducing stewardship codes vary across jurisdictions. Whereas the U.K.
stewardship code was designed to address the need for effective risk control
following the global financial crisis, Japan’s stewardship code was designed to
reverse declining profitability and increase investor returns by creating a “warmer
climate” for foreign investors and shareholder activists.161 The Japanese example
also shows how political friction can affect the content of stewardship codes. It
appears that the Japanese code adopted a “relatively gentle stance”162 on
shareholder engagement and activism as a way to appease critics of the more
shareholder-oriented focus of the Japanese reforms.163
Some scholars have viewed the idea of granting stronger rights to
shareholders, or encouraging them to become more engaged in corporate
governance, as akin to letting the fox guard the henhouse.164 However, Larry Fink,
CEO of BlackRock, one of the world’s largest institutional investors, has declared
that companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders,
employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate.”165 There is an
increasing number of examples of this trend, whereby institutional investors have
pursued broad social or stakeholder-related goals. In 2017, for instance, BlackRock,
which is estimated to be one of the top three shareholders in every company listed
155. See generally Hill, supra note 6, at 507–13.
156. Id. at 507–08.
157. Id. at 508–09.
158. Id. at 509–13.
159. Ernest Lim & Luh Luh Lan, The Role of Institutional Investors in Singapore and Hong
Kong: Stewardship Codes and Ownership Engagement (Aug. 17–18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(presented at the Corporate Governance and Regulation: East Meets West Conference
at the Univ. of Sydney).
160. See Bowley & Hill, supra note 146.
161. See Ben McLannahan, Japanese Reformists Face Challenge Over Shake-Up of Corporate Governance
Laws, FIN. TIMES (May 25, 2014).
162. See Gen Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes: The Case of Japan, Berkeley, BUS. L.
J., 40 n.152 (forthcoming) (available at https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3311279).
163. Id.
164. Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L 311
(2011); see also Alan Dignam, The Future of Shareholder Democracy in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639 (2013).
165. See BlackRock, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs, A Sense of Purpose (Jan. 12, 2018);
Peter Horst, BlackRock CEO Tells Companies to Contribute to Society. Here’s Where to Start, FORBES (Jan.
16, 2018).
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on the FTSE index, wrote to the chairs of over 300 U.K. companies, announcing
that it would vote against executive pay increases, unless they were linked to strong
and sustainable long-term corporate performance and were also matched by pay
increases to rank-and-file employees.166 Also, a list of the top ten corporate
governance issues in the United States, released by Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) in 2019, goes well beyond financial performance of corporations and
includes topics such as board and C-suite diversity, climate change, executive
misconduct, sexual harassment, and gun violence.167 Environmental and social
issues now account for the majority of all shareholder proposals filed in the United
States and companies are showing greater willingness to reach agreements with
proponents of such resolutions as a result of the increasing interest in these issues
demonstrated by the largest institutional investors.168
V. CONCLUSION
It is often assumed that there is a unified and cohesive approach to the law of
fiduciary duties across common law jurisdictions. This Article examines three
common law jurisdictions: the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia,
and shows that, in spite of their common legal heritage, there are nonetheless
sufficiently significant differences to challenge any notion of homogeneity of
directors’ and officers’ duties in these jurisdictions.169
This Article also discusses a new and important transnational regulatory
development: the rise of corporate governance codes in both common law and civil
law jurisdictions. These codes, which are usually non-binding, represent an
interesting overlay to the law of directors’ and officers’ duties. Although corporate
governance codes often complement and bolster these duties, they can also create
tensions with them. The tension between shareholder versus stakeholder rights and
interests is a clear example of this situation. Also, the focus on corporate culture,
purpose, values and trust in some modern corporate governance codes shows that
there are multiple problems in corporate law. Corporate underperformance is one
important issue, but organizational integrity is equally critical.
While corporate governance codes could potentially increase convergence
regarding directors’ and officers’ duties across jurisdictions, in fact, these codes are
issued by different bodies, with different purposes and goals. They also vary in their
content and are constantly evolving. Corporate governance codes are therefore
likely to increase, rather than reduce, jurisdictional differences relating to directors’
and officers’ duties.

166. See Angela Monaghan, World’s Largest Fund Manager Demands Cuts to Executive Pay and
Bonuses, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2017).
167. See Kosmas Papadopoulos, ISS Lists Top 10 Corporate Governance Topics to Watch in 2019,
THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 11, 2019), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/11/iss- liststop-10-corporate-governance-topics-to-watch-in-2019/.
168. See Shirley Westcott, 2019 Proxy Season Preview, THE ADVISOR (Alliance Advisors,
Bloomfield, N.J.) (April 2019) at 1, 4.
169. See generally Hill & Conaglen, supra note 12.

